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This paper investigates the time-inconsistency problem of labor taxes in an economy with
balanced-budget policies and no capital taxes. With full commitment, we show that Ramsey
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to tax capital. We numerically show that these make labor taxes increasing over time. With
limited commitment, we find that this time-inconsistency problem leads to underprovision
of public consumption. For our baseline parameter values, we find that imposing carefully
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1 Introduction
Following the rules versus discretion debate pioneered by Kydland and Prescott (1997), many
economists have suggested not to tax capital at all in order to alleviate the time-inconsistency
problem of capital taxation.1 If capital income were not taxed, what would be the properties
of optimal labor taxes and of the associated time-inconsistency problem? Would there be any
additional constitutional constraints that could further alleviate that problem?
This paper studies a dynamic policy game between governments and households. This paper
contributes to this literature by providing an application of already existing theoretical and numer-
ical methods to the study of the time-inconsistency problem of labor taxes and how this problem is
affected by constitutional constraints. As suggested in Rogoff (1987), changes in the constitutional
constraints can be interpreted as changes in the structure of the policy game. In the paper, we
evaluate the effect of different constitutional constraints on the outcomes and welfare that can be
sustained in equilibrium.
The environment in this paper is very close to that of Phelan and Stacchetti (2001). We
consider a benevolent government that, in order to finance an endogenous public consumption,
chooses the labor income tax rate that maximizes welfare. We focus on balanced-budget policies
with no capital taxes. First, we study this optimal policy problem with full commitment, that
is, under the assumption that in all future periods, the government is committed to the sequence
of taxes chosen at the initial date. Analytically, we show that optimal labor taxes change with
the cost of distortionary taxation and with the cost of not being able to tax capital. Numerically,
we find that these factors make optimal labor taxes increasing over time for all initial levels of
capital.2 Thus, governments find optimal to set current labor taxes low and future labor taxes
high. However, as the future becomes present, the temptation is to lower labor taxes again.
Second, we study the optimal policy problem with limited commitment, that is, under the
assumption that in all future periods, the government is free to choose the labor tax rate but is
1For example, Lucas (1990) and, more recently, Mankiw et al. (2009).
2The finding that optimal labor taxes are increasing over time when capital cannot be taxed is connected to the
comments of Atkenson et al. (1999). They observe that, a positive tax on capital is comparable to an increasing
tax rate on consumption and the latter corresponds to an increasing tax rate on labor income. These policies are
comparable but not equivalent. In our economy, we don't count with consumption taxes and not having capital
taxes eliminates an instrument that is necessary for decentralization and therefore changes the Ramsey problem.
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committed to comply with some exogenously imposed constitutional constraints. As in Domínguez
and Feng (2014) for capital taxes, we evaluate the Ramsey plans starting from any initial conditions
and propose the highest and lowest Ramsey labor taxes for each level of capital as the natural
upper and lower bounds on labor taxes. Then we quantify the effects of these natural bounds (as
exogenously imposed constitutional constraints) on the whole set of sustainable equilibria.
Our findings are as follows. Our proposed natural bounds on labor taxes rates have no effect,
or minimal effect, on the Best Sustainable Equilibrium (BSE). For our baseline parameterization,
the Ramsey can be sustained as the best and this is not changed (or just slightly) by these bounds.
However, our proposed natural bounds affect the Worst Sustainable Equilibrium (WSE). The upper
bounds reduce the welfare provided by the WSE as they rule out optimal reaction choices by the
government when facing worst expectations by the public. The lower bounds, on the other hand,
increase the welfare of the WSE, as they prevent worst expectations that lead to underprovision
of public consumption. Interestingly, considering both upper and lower bounds together, leads to
WSE with even higher welfare. We suggest that tighter bounds induce smooth higher taxes in the
worst that lead to higher and smooth public consumption and higher welfare gains.
This paper builds on the literature on optimal taxation.3 This literature finds that labor taxes
should be roughly constant.4 In contrast, in our setup, we find that optimal labor tax rates are
increasing over time during the transition. Thus, we argue that the time-inconsistency problem
is now relocated towards labor taxes. This result is related to those of Correia (1996) and Rogoff
(1985). Correia (1996) studies capital taxation when another factor of production cannot be taxed
and finds that the optimal steady state capital tax is not longer zero. In our model, the constraints
that capital cannot be taxed and bonds cannot be issued change the properties of optimal labor
taxes. A similar result is also found in McCallum (1995)'s analysis of delegation in monetary policy
as in Rogoff (1985). Delegation relocates the time-inconsistency problem to that of the choice of
the conservative central banker.
This paper provides an application of the recent developments in the literature on time-
3See Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari and Kehoe (1998), Chari et al. (1994), Stockman (2001), etc.
4More precisely, in Ramsey problems with full-commitment, access to bonds, capital taxes, and with homothetic
preferences, optimal labor taxes are typically low (even negative) in the initial period and then positive and roughly
constant from then on. In contrast, in our paper, labor taxes are increasing over the transitional phase.
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inconsistency of optimal plans, as originated by Kydland and Prescott (1977). This type of
problems were formalized as a policy game by Chari and Kehoe (1990) and extended to dynamic
games with natural state variables by Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) and Sleet (1997).5 Judd et al.
(2003) and, more recently, Feng et al. (2014) and Sleet and Yeltekin (2015) provide algorithms to
numerically approximate the equilibrium value correspondence in dynamic games.
The rest of the paper follows the following structure. Section 2 describes the economy. Section
3 characterizes optimal labor taxes with full commitment. Section 4 discusses the solution method
and characterizes optimal labor taxes with limited commitment. Section 5 concludes. Details of
the calibration, Tables and Figures can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Economy
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households, a continuum of identical
firms, and a benevolent government. Time is infinite and indexed by subscript t = 0, 1, 2, ...
The representative household lives forever and values private consumption ct, labor nt and
public consumption gt over its life-time, and according to
(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, nt, gt), (1)
with the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), and the (normalized by (1− β)) instantaneous utility
u(ct, nt, gt) =
ct
1−σ
1− σ − γn
nt
1+χ
1 + χ
+ γg
gt
1−σ
1− σ , (2)
where σ ≥ 0 and χ ≥ 0 are the inverses of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consump-
tion and of labor respectively, and γn ≥ 0 and γg ≥ 0 are the weights on labor disutility and on
public consumption utility respectively.
In period 0, each household owns the same initial level of capital k0. In each period, households
receive capital income (the principal plus a return rt net of the depreciation rate δ on their capital
holdings, (1 + rt − δ) kt) and wage income (the real wage wt net of taxes τt on their supplied labor,
5An alternative approach is to consider Markov-perfect equilibria as in Klein et al. (2008).
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(1− τt)wtnt). This income is used to consume in that period and accumulate capital for the next
period. Then the budget constraint of the representative household is
kt+1 + ct = (1 + rt − δ) kt + (1− τt)wtnt. (3)
The representative household chooses {ct, nt, kt+1}∞t=0 to maximize his welfare (1) subject to
the budget constraint (3), and the no-Ponzi-game (NPG) condition limt→∞ ptkt+1 ≥ 0, where pt is
the multiplier on (3). The resulting first-order conditions are
−u2,t = (1− τt)wtu1,t, (4)
u1,t = β (1 + rt+1 − δ)u1,t+1, (5)
and the transversality (TV) condition limt→∞ βtu1,tkt+1 = 0, where ui denotes the partial derivative
of u with respect to its ith argument. Other derivatives follow a similar notation.
The representative firm produces the final good using the technology yt = f(kt, nt) = k
α
t n
1−α
t ,
with α ∈ (0, 1). We assume firms operate in perfectly competitive markets, then rt and wt equal
the marginal products of capital and labor respectively
rt = f1(kt, nt) and wt = f2(kt, nt). (6)
In each period, the benevolent government finances an endogenous public consumption gt with
taxes on labor income
gt = τtwtnt. (7)
In the absence of constitutional constraints on labor taxes, the tax rate τt can take any value in
the interval [0, τmax], with 0 < τmax ≤ 1.6 Then, a constitutional constraint on labor taxes takes the
form of lower and/or upper limits on the labor tax rates, i.e. τt ∈ T =
{
[τLB, τUB]|τLB ≤ τt ≤ τUB
}
.
6In this model, with only one source of government income, the non-negativity of public consumption requires
a non-negative labor tax. Moreover, Laffer curve effects generate a 'natural' upper bound on labor tax rates.
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The resource constraint of the economy is
f(kt, nt) + (1− δ)kt = ct + kt+1 + gt. (8)
A competitive equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1 Given the tax rates {τt}∞t=0, and initial capital k0, a competitive equilibrium allo-
cation {ct, nt, kt+1, gt}∞t=0 and prices {pt, rt, wt}∞t=0 are such that: (i) given prices, tax rates and
k0, the representative household maximizes welfare (1) subject to the budget constraint (3) and
the NPG condition; (ii) factors are paid their marginal products (6); (iii) the government budget
constraint (7) is satisfied; and (iv) all markets clear.
3 Optimal Labor Taxes with Full Commitment
In this Section we study optimal labor taxes with full commitment. We present the Ram-
sey problem, solve it and characterize the optimal taxes with full commitment analitically and
numerically.
We follow the primal approach. We substitute the first-order conditions (4)-(6) into the budget
constraint (3) to obtain for each period the implementability condition
u1,tct + u2,tnt + u1,tkt+1 =
1
β
u1,t−1kt, (9)
whose right-hand side is replaced by u1,0 (1 + f1(k0, n0)− δ) k0 in period 0. In addition, as capital
cannot be taxed, governments lack an instrument to decentralize the Euler condition (5). Then,
in each period t ≥ 1, governments must satisfy the zero capital tax constraint
u1,t−1 = β(1 + f1(kt, nt)− δ)u1,t. (10)
Furthermore, any bounds on labor tax rates τt ∈ T are assumed not to bind with full commitment.
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The government's optimization problem is defined as follows. The government at date 0 chooses
the sequences {ct, nt, gt, kt+1}∞t=0 to maximize the welfare of the representative household (1) sub-
ject to the resource constraint (8), the implementability condition (9), and the zero capital tax
constraint (10), given the initial condition k0, and the TV condition. All future governments are
committed to follow the sequence of taxes chosen by the government at date 0.
The Lagragian for this optimization problem is
∞∑
t=0
βt {u(ct, nt, gt) + λt [u1,tct + u2,tnt] + (λt − λt+1)u1,tkt+1
+ µt [f(kt, nt) + (1− δ)kt − ct − kt+1 − gt]
+ θt+1 [u1,t − β(1 + f1(kt+1, nt+1)− δ)u1,t+1]} − λ0u1,0[1 + f1(k0, n0)− δ]k0. (11)
Note that λ−1 = 0 and θ0 = 0. The solution to this problem satisfies constraints (8)-(10), and the
next first order conditions for consumption, labor, public consumption and capital for all t ≥ 1:7
c−σt
{
1 + λt(1− σ)− σ (λt − λt+1) kt+1
ct
+ σ
(
θt
ct
(1 + f1,t − δ)− θt+1
ct
)}
= µt, (12)
γnn
χ
t (1 + λt(1 + χ)) + c
−σ
t θtf12,t = f2,tµt, (13)
γgg
−σ
t = µt, (14)
µt = βµt+1 (1 + f1,t+1 − δ) + c−σt+1 (λt − λt+1) + βc−σt+1θt+1f22,t, (15)
where µt, λt, and θt are the Lagrange multipliers on (8), (9), and (10), respectively.
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Let's define Ψt ≡ σ
(
θt
ct
(1 + f1,t − δ)− θt+1ct
)
− θt f12,tf2,t , and Γt ≡ σ
kt+1
ct
, combining (12)-(13)
together with (4) and (6), we find:
Proposition 1 The optimal labor tax rates with full commitment for all periods t ≥ 1 are
τt =
λt(σ + χ)
1 + λt(1 + χ)
+
(λt − λt+1) Γt
1 + λt(1 + χ)
− Ψt
1 + λt(1 + χ)
. (16)
Proof. See the Appendix. P
7The first order conditions in period 0 are different due to the initial wealth.
8As usual, an optimal interior solution is assumed exist.
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Proposition 1 characterizes optimal labor taxes with full commitment. There we see that
Ramsey labor taxes move with the multiplier λt and the term Ψt. The multiplier λt on the
implementability condition (9) measures the distortionary cost of taxation. If governments could
issue bonds, there would be one life-time implementability condition and the multiplier λt would
be constant. However, as they cannot, there is one implementability condition per period and the
multiplier changes over time. The term Ψt changes with the multiplier θt, which measures the
cost of not being able to tax capital. If governments could tax capital, θt and Ψt would be zero.
Then, for our homothetic utility function (2), when governments can issue bonds and tax capital,
optimal labor taxes with full commitment are constant over time for all t ≥ 1. However, when
they cannot issue bonds and cannot tax capital, what is the pattern of optimal labor tax rates?
For the calibration detailed in the Appendix, Figure 1 displays the optimal labor taxes with full
commitment and other terms for different initial levels of capital. We see that Ramsey labor taxes
are increasing over time towards the optimal steady state level for all initial levels of capital. The
multiplier λt is increasing (decreasing) over time for low (high) levels of initial capital. This suggests
that, with endogenous public consumption and no bonds, a Ramsey planner shifts the distortionary
cost of taxation towards periods with a higher capital stock. The multiplier θt is positive and
converges to zero, which is consistent with the optimality of no permanent intertemporal distortions
(see Albanesi and Armenter (2012)). For our specification, Ψt =
[
(1− α)(1− δ) + αkt+1
kt
− θt+1
θt
]
θt
ct
.
During the transition, Ψt is negative (positive) whenever the ratio
θt+1
θt
is sufficiently large (small).
As θt increases with capital, this happens for low (high) levels of initial capital.
Plotting the first two terms in (16), we find that without the third term, Ramsey taxes would
follow the pattern of the cost of distortionary taxation and would be increasing (decreasing) over
time for low (high) levels of initial capital. With the third term, the pattern changes. At low levels
of initial capital, the multiplier λt is increasing but the term Ψt is negative, overall the first effect
dominates and labor taxes are increasing. At high levels of capital, the multiplier λt is decreasing
but the term Ψt is large and positive, overall the second effect dominates and labor taxes are again
increasing. Then, for all initial levels of capital, Ramsey labor taxes are increasing over time.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
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This pattern for Ramsey labor taxes has the following implications for time-inconsistency. The
benevolent government lowers labor taxes today and promises higher labor taxes for the future.
However, as the future becomes present, the government is tempted to lower labor taxes again. This
form of time-inconsistency problem in labor taxes seems quite different from the one in capital
taxes (where governments increase capital taxes today and promise zero capital taxes for the
future). However, the temptation behind both time-inconsistency problems is in essence the same.
Looking at the implementability condition (9), a Ramsey planner would like to reduce the RHS
of that constraint (and make the overall cost of distortionary taxation lower) by increasing capital
taxes. In the absence of a capital tax, a Ramsey planner can reduce the RHS by inducing a boom
in consumption that depresses the marginal utility of consumption. Such a boom in consumption
can be achieved by lowering labor taxes today and increasing labor taxes in the future.
4 Optimal Labor Taxes with Limited Commitment
This Section departs from the assumption of full commitment. Here we consider limited com-
mitment in the sense that future governments can reconsider the labor taxes but they commit to
comply with the constitutional constraints.
This Section follows closely Domínguez and Feng (2014), but without capital taxes, and extends
the analysis to the case of constitutional constraints on labor taxes. We next describe the game.
4.1 The Policy Game
Our game is a dynamic policy game between a strategic government and atomistic households.
Before the game starts, a set of constitutional constraints is exogenously imposed. We assume that
government and households understand these constraints and governments conform with them.
In our setup, households are anonymous and their choices cannot be observed by the government
or by other households. On the other hand, aggregate choices are observable. Then, households'
and government's choices depend only on the public history, denoted by ζt = (ζ1, ..., ζt), where
ζt = (τt, kt+1). As in Feng (2014), we do not make use of public randomization devices.
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In any given period t, the timing of choices is as follows. First, the government chooses a labor
tax rate for that period. The government's strategy, denoted σG,t(ζ
t−1), is a choice of labor tax,
within the range allowed in the constitution, as a function of ζt=1, i.e. τt = σG,t(ζ
t−1). Second,
households choose consumption, labor and savings for that period. The household's strategy,
denoted σH,t(ζ
t), is a choice of a current allocation as a function of the public history (ζt−1, τt), i.e.
(ct, nt, kt+1) = σH,t(ζ
t−1, τt). We assume a symmetric strategy equilibrium, where all households
make the same choices along the equilibrium path. Payments to capital and labor, rt and wt are
determined by market clearing. Public consumption gt is pinned down by the collected tax revenue.
After each history ζt−1, a strategy profile (σG, σH) induces an outcome and a continuation strategy
profile, which produces a payoff for the government and a payoff for the households.
As in Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), we define a sustainable
equilibrium as follows:
Definition 2 A symmetric strategy profile (σG, σH) is a sustainable equilibrium if, for all t ≥ 0,
the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) given the symmetric strategy for households σH,t, the continuation payoff for the government is
higher than the payoff from any deviation to a different strategy σ˜G,t for every history ζ
t−1; and
(ii) given the strategy for the government σG,t, the continuation payoff for the household is higher
than the payoff from any deviation to a different strategy σ˜H,t for every history (ζ
t−1, τt).
The above two conditions guarantee sequential rationality. The first condition implies that gov-
ernments have no incentive to deviate. The second implies that households behave competitively.
In Domínguez and Feng (2014), we follow Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) (who extend the APS
method, Abreu et al. (1990), to dynamic policy games) to show that the above game has a recursive
structure once added as state variables a continuation value for the government and a continuation
value for the households. The first is the next period's equilibrium payoff (welfare) of the game
and the second is the next period's marginal value of capital, i.e.
mt+1 ≡ (1 + rt+1 − δ)u1,t+1. (17)
As in Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), our dynamic economy can be thought of a sequence of static
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economies with endogenously changing state variables. In such static economy, for given mt+1, τt,
and kt, the household's problem is that of choosing ct, nt, kt+1 to maximize u(ct, nt, gt)+βmt+1kt+1
subject to the budget constraint (3). In Domínguez and Feng (2014), we show that, for the specific
utility and production functions considered in this paper, and given mt+1 as in (17), the solution
to this recursive problem (the static household's problem considered in each period) is equivalent
to that of the sequence problem as presented in Section 2.
It is useful to consider the competitive equilibrium of the static economy (composed of the static
household's problem, the firm's static problem and the government's budget constraint). Denoting
next period variables with subscript +, that competitive equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 3 The vector (c, n, k+, g, w, r) constitutes a competitive equilibrium of the above static
economy, denoted (c, n, k+, g, w, r) ∈ CE(k, τ,m+), if and only if
u1 = βm+, (CE-1)
−u2 = (1− τ)wu1, (CE-2)
k+ = (1 + r − δ)k + (1− τ)wn− c, (CE-3)
g = τnwn, (CE-4)
r = f1(k, n), (CE-5)
w = f2(k, n). (CE-6)
Given m+ as in (17), the household's static problem is equivalent to the sequential problem.
Then, it follows that for given {τt}∞t=0, and k0, a sequence {ct, nt, kt+1, gt, wt, rt}∞t=0 that is a com-
petitive equilibrium of the static economy in each period, it is also a competitive equilibrium of
the dynamic economy.
In a competitive equilibrium, for given continuation values h+ and m+, the values (payoffs) for
the government and for the household are defined as h = u(c, n, g) + βh+ and m = (1 + r − δ)u1
respectively. For a given initial capital k, the set of values (m,h) that can be attained in a
sustainable equilibrum is called the equilibrium value correspondence V(k).
Let's define an arbitrary value correspondenceW as any mapping from k into (m,h) and assume
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that contains V(k). The equilibrium value correspondence V(k) can be found and numerically
approximated as a fixed point of W(k) by imposing the conditions for a sustainable equilibrium.
These conditions are summarized in consistency and admissibility.
Definition 4 The vector ψ = (τ, c, n, k+, g, w, r,m+, h+) is consistent with respect to W at k if
(c, n, k+, g, w, r) ∈ CE(k, τ,m+), τ ∈ T , (m,h) ∈W(k), and (m+, h+) ∈W(k+), where
m(k, ψ) := (1 + r − δ)u1(c, n, g), (18)
h(k, ψ) := u (c, n, g) + βh+. (19)
Definition 5 The vector ψ = (τ, c, n, k+, g, w, r,m+, h+) is admissible with respect to W at k if it
is consistent and
h(k, ψ) ≥ h˜(k, ψ˜), (20)
with ψ˜ = (τ˜ , c˜, n˜, k˜+, g˜, w˜, r˜, m˜+, h˜+), where (c˜, n˜, k˜+, g˜, w˜, r˜) ∈ CE (k, τ˜ , m˜+), τ˜ ∈ T , and
h˜(k, ψ˜) = max
τ˜
{
min
c˜,n˜,k˜+,(m˜+,h˜+)∈W(k˜+)
[
u(c˜, n˜, g˜) + βh˜+
]}
.
Here h˜(k, ψ˜) is the worst possible payoff for the government (the best deviation). For a vector
ψ that satisfies consistency, households behave competitively. If the vector ψ satisfies also admissi-
bility, the incentive compatibility constraint (20) guarantees that the government does not want to
deviate. The constitutional constraints on labor taxes change the structure of the game by affect-
ing both conditions. They reduce the set of vectors ψ that are consistent, the set of continuation
values that can be expected and the taxes that can be imposed in the best deviation.
4.2 Computation of the Equilibrium
In order to compute the set of equilibrium values, we define an operator B as follows.
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Definition 6 For a given set of equilibrium values W, operator B is defined as
B(W)(k) = {(m,h) | ∃ ψ is admissible with respect to W at k} .
Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) prove that this operator has the following properties:
1. If W ⊆ B(W), then B(W) ⊆ V.
2. V is compact and the largest set of equilibrium values W such that W = B(W).
3. B(·) is monotone and preserves compactness.
4. If we defineWn+1 = B(Wn) for all n ≥ 0, and the equilibrium value correspondenceV ⊂W0,
then limn→∞Wn = V.
Result 1 has been called self-generation. From the definition of the set of equilibrium values, it is
straightforward to see that V ⊆ B (V). Together with result 1, it is fairly easy to reach the second
result. Results 3 and 4 will be used to approximate the set of equilibrium values.
Fernï¾÷ndez-Villaverde and Tsyvinski (2001) and Domínguez (2010) provide a numerical im-
plementation for B by adapting the approximation technique developed by Judd, Yeltekin and
Conklin (2003) and Sleet and Yeltekin (2015). This method requires the convexity of the set
of equilibrium values V, which can be guaranteed by incorporating a publicly observed random
variable as in Phelan and Stacchetti (2001). This approximation scheme uses a polar coordinate
system to represent the position of an arbitrary point on a manifold. Thus, to approximate a con-
vex set, one only needs to keep track of the supporting hyperplanes at each angle around the polar.
It reduces the computational costs substantially. However, randomization and convexification will
arbitrarily enlarge the equilibrium value correspondence.
Instead, we apply the methodology developed by Feng et al. (2014).9 Their method partitions
the state space into a finite set of simplices. Compatible with this partitioning, they then consider
9We refer to Feng et al. (2014) for details in the approximation of convex-valued sets and for Feng (2014) and
Domínguez and Feng (2014) for applications of the algorithm to similar games (and for recovering the strategies).
13
a sequence of step correspondences, which take constant set-values on each simplex. The main
advantage of this method is that it does not require convexity of the equilibrium set, and, thus, it
is not necessary to introduce a randomization device as in Phelan and Stacchetti (2001). However,
this method faces some computational challenges. To facilitate the computation, we assume that
W is convex-valued at given (k,m). This assumption implies that, for given (k,m), there exist
strategies that support any h ∈ [h¯, h], where
h¯(k,m) := max
h
{h|(m,h) ∈W(k)} , (21)
h(k,m) := min
h
{h|(m,h) ∈W(k)} . (22)
For a given k, the worst sustainable equilibrium yields the lowest value for the government h˜(k) =
minm h(k,m), and the best sustainable equilibrium yields the highest value maxm h¯(k,m). Feng
(2014) proves that the boundaries of the set of equilibrium values for sustainable equilibria can be
characterized by themselves. The repeated application of operator F as described below generates
a sequence of sets that converges to the equilibrium value correspondence V. We refer the reader
to Feng (2014) for the proof of the theorems and the numerical implementation of operator F.
Definition 7 For any convex-valued correspondence Wˆ =
{
(m,h)|h ∈ [h0(k,m), h¯0(k,m)]}, de-
fine operator F as follows:
F(Wˆ)(k) =
{
(m,h)|h ∈ [h1(k,m), h¯1(k,m)]} ,
where
h¯1(k,m) = max
τ
u(c, n, g) + βh¯0(k+,m+) (23)
h1(k,m) = max
{
max
τ
u(c, n, g) + βh0(k+,m+), h˜
0(k)
}
(24)
h˜0(k) = max
τ
{
min
c,n,k+,m+
u(c, n, g) + βh0(k+,m+)
}
(25)
such that vector (τ, c, n, k+, g, w, r,m+, h+) is admissible with respect to Wˆ at k. Define h(k,m) =
−∞, h¯(k,m) = +∞ if no such vector exists.
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4.3 Quantitative Analysis
For the calibration detailed in the Appendix, we first propose some constitutional constraints
on labor taxes and then approximate the set of sustainable equilibria of our policy game under
those constraints.10
4.3.1 Natural Bounds on Labor Tax Rates
Following Domínguez and Feng (2014), we explore whether there exist constitutional constraints
on labor taxes that could improve all equilibria. In order to construct these 'optimal' constraints,
in that paper we propose to examine the prescriptions of a Ramsey planner with full commitment
and without constitutional constraints. For a given level of capital, we define the natural upper
and lower bounds on labor taxation as the highest and lowest levels of labor tax rates that a
Ramsey planner (starting from any initial conditions) would prescribe for that level of capital.
Figure 2 depicts these natural bounds on labor taxes for our benchmark parameter values
and for other selected parametrizations. For balanced-budget policies and no capital taxes, these
bounds can be described as follows. The natural lower bound on labor taxes increases with the level
of capital. Let's define a threshold level of capital kˆ. The natural upper on labor taxes increases
(decreases) with the level of capital for all k ≤ kˆ (≥ kˆ ). Interestingly, this threshold level of
capital coincides numerically with the steady state level of capital in the Ramsey allocation.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
Jointly, both bounds define a range of allowed taxes that is larger for higher (lower) levels
of capital for all k ≤ kˆ (k ≥ kˆ ). That is, for low or very high levels of capital, the Ramsey
delivers very tight bounds on labor taxes. However, around the steady state level of capital,
the natural bounds on labor taxes are wider. While the shape of these bounds is robust across
different parametrization, the level and width of the bounds is affected by the parameters. For
a lower elasticity of labor supply, the natural bounds are tighter. For a higher weight on public
consumption, both bounds shift upwards and define a wider set of allowed taxes.
10We discretize the state space with 400 equally spaced points for k ∈ [0.01, 1.5], 400 points for m, and 100 points
for τ ∈ [0, 0.9]. We use linear interpolation for values falling outside of the grid. We ran our C++ MPI code using
an IBM iDataPlex cluster, with 50 Intel Sandy Bridge 2.6GHZ processors.
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4.3.2 The Set of Sustainable Equilibria for Different Constitutional Constraints
The above natural bounds on labor taxes have the potential to improve all sustainable equilibria.
Suppose the economy faces a situation in which, without constitutional constraints, the BSE
coincides with the Ramsey. Let us now impose the natural bounds as the constitutional constraint
on labor taxes. First, these bounds have the potential to eliminate worst outcomes (if those are
sustained by taxes outside of the bounds) and then may improve the WSE. Second, the bounds
do not bind at the Ramsey. Then, if the increase in the WSE is not enough to make the incentive
compatibility constraint (20) bind, these natural bounds do not worsen the BSE and may improve
all equilibria.
Figure 3 shows the set of sustainable equilibria under different constitutional constraints for
our benchmark parameter values and for other parametrizations. In our experiment, we consider
no constraints and three other distinct constitutional environments: the natural upper bound on
labor taxes; the natural lower bound on labor taxes; and both natural bounds on labor taxes.
Figure 4 depicts the allocation and taxes that support the WSE for our benchmark parameters.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here.]
Across all selected parameterizations and relative to the equilibria with no constitutional con-
straints, we find the following. First, the three constitutional environments have none or little
effect on the welfare provided by the BSE. However, they do affect the WSE.
The natural upper bound on labor taxes actually decreases the welfare provided by the WSE.
The intuition is that while the upper bound does not affect the optimal government's choices at
the best it does restrict the government's optimal choices when facing worst expectations. With
no constraints, Figure 4 shows that taxes in the WSE are in some periods higher than without
the upper bounds. Moreover, at the WSE, the taxes with the upper bound display an irregular
pattern that delivers uneven sequences of (public and private) consumption and labor.
In contrast, the natural lower bound on labor taxes improves the WSE. With no constraints
and with lower bounds, both WSE induce similar patterns of capital, labor and output. Relative to
no constraints, the lower bounds induce higher taxation and higher (lower) levels public (private)
consumption. This mix of private/public consumption delivers higher welfare.
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Interestingly, both natural bounds together deliver the WSE with the highest welfare. As Figure
3 shows, the set of sustainable equilibria shrinks dramatically when both bounds are considered.
From Figure 4, we see that these tighter bounds induce smooth taxes in the worst and a smooth
and higher public consumption that induces higher welfare.
The constitutional environment affects the equilibrium marginal values of capital that are
supported. The natural upper (lower) bound on labor taxes supports lower (higher) marginal
values of capital. With both bounds together, the set of equilibrium marginal values of capital is
very small. This may explain the smoothness of the allocation at the WSE seen in Figure 4.
5 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the time-inconsistency problem of labor taxes when governments
cannot issue bonds and cannot tax capital. We have learned that, in this environment, governments
find optimal to set low labor taxes for today and high labor taxes for the future. However, in the
future, governments are tempted to lower labor taxes again. With limited commitment, we have
found that this time-inconsistency problem leads to underprovision of public consumption. In
dealing with this problem, we have learned that imposing carefully chosen lower bounds on labor
taxes (alone or in combination with upper bounds) as constitutional constraints can be optimal.
Such bounds induce higher public consumption and higher welfare in worst equilibria.
An important extension to our analysis would be to allow for government bonds. As shown in
Domínguez (2007), government debt affects the properties of optimal taxes without commitment.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Calibration
In order to calibrate the parameters for our quantitative exercise, we consider an initial steady
state that corresponds to an economy with similar statistics to those of the US. In our simulations
one period corresponds to one year.
Our calibration follows that of Chari et al. (1994), which is consistent with U.S. data. In
the initial steady state, the tax rates on capital and labor income are set equal to 27.1 and 23.7
per cent respectively. We choose a public consumption to output ratio equal to 19 per cent and
consider no public debt.
We assume the utility function (2) and a Cobb-Douglas production function yt = k
α
t n
1−α
t . We
choose a capital share of 0.34 and a depreciation rate of 0.08. The discount factor is set to deliver
a capital to output ratio of 2.71 in the initial steady state. In (2), the coefficient of risk aversion
σ is set equal to unity and the labor-supply elasticity is set so that χ= 0.32. The weight on labor
disutility γn is chosen so that hours worked are 0.23 in the initial steady state. The weight on
public consumption γg is chosen so that social planner's solution delivers a public consumption to
output ratio equal to 19 per cent.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in our baseline economy.
Table 1: Parameter Values for the Baseline Economy
Preference β = 0.968 σ = 1.0 γn = 7.694 χ = 0.32 γg = 0.333
Technology α = 0.34 δ = 0.08
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6.2 Figures
Figure 1: Ramsey Labor Tax and some Terms for Different Initial Levels of Capital
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(e) Terms 1+2: λt(σ+χ)
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Figure 2: Natural Bounds on Labor Tax Rates
(a) Baseline Parameters
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(c) Lower Elasticity, χ = 1.00
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Figure 3: Set of Sustainable Equilibria
(a) Baseline Parameters
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Figure 4: Simulations for the WSE during the Transition
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